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In summary, Comay has written a startling and refreshing book. She has 
marshaled an immense amount of cultural-historical analysis, a great deal of 
considered reflection, and a host of insightful arguments into an interpretation 
of Hegel that goes well beyond its avowed topic of the French Revolution. 
This interpretation poses challenges not only to its explicit targets, but to all 
serious students of Hegel who contend with the difficulties of his views on 
history, experience, politics, and the weight of cultural tradition. She accom-
plishes all this in a reasonably-sized book with a rousing prose st yle, and in a 
way that will hopefully provoke further work along the same or similar lines.
Sebastian Rand
Georgia State University
Notes
1. One arguable exception here is her reading of Hegel on the Pöbel, which attributes to 
him a kind of intentional, if unacknowledged, performative undermining of his apparent 
explicit claims to completeness and closure. But if Comay is right, those explicit claims are 
only apparent.
Lydia L. Moland. Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern Universit y Press, 2011. xii + 223 pages.
This is an excellent book. Its guiding question might be formulated as fol-
lows: how is it possible, from a Hegelian point of view, for someone to be 
committed to the ideals of nationalism and patriotism, while at the same 
time being committed to the ideals of cosmopolitanism? At first glance, it 
appears that nationalism and patriotism stand in stark contrast to any form 
of cosmopolitanism, and that genuine cosmopolitanism demands that one 
abandon the cultural and emotive attachments that normally characterize 
nationalism and patriotism. Moland argues, however, that it is possible to 
find in the Hegelian corpus a philosophically and politically credible way of 
thinking about patriotism and cosmopolitanism, one that entails the actual 
compatibilit y—and even interdependence—of patriotism and cosmopolitanism.
In order to make her case, Moland takes the reader on a carefully-
conceived and illuminating tour through Hegel’s thought on freedom and 
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agency, politics and the state, and nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The 
crux of Moland’s pro-Hegelian argument, I would say, depends on two central 
and interrelated points: first, there is the philosophical-historical point that (for 
Hegel) the individual becomes truly free not by abstracting from her desires 
(as Kant held), but rather by shaping her desires through the ongoing activit y 
of mutual, intersubjective recognition (in other words, the individual becomes 
free not by abandoning her commitments, but rather by transforming them 
in the midst of her engagement with other rational selves); and secondly, 
there is the historical-philosophical point that, for Hegel, patriotism need not 
be understood only as a constraining, chauvinistic commitment to national 
feeling, but can also be understood as a potentially liberating commitment to 
that which is greater than oneself (thus patriotism need not be understood 
in terms of one’s regional or national commitments alone, but can also be 
understood in terms of one’s commitment to a potentially universal, and 
thus genuinely cosmopolitan, common good). When properly understood, 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism—according to Moland—can even be seen as 
requiring or depending on one another: the universalit y of cosmopolitanism 
does not require that one abstract from one’s particular desires, but requires 
instead that one shape or cultivate these particular desires in the right way; thus 
the universalit y of cosmopolitanism depends on the proper formation of one’s 
particular patriotic commitments, and—in turn—a rightly-formed patriotism 
depends on a concretely-instantiated (and not merely abstract) cosmopolitanism.
Moland’s scholarship in this book is reliable, well-grounded, and insight-
ful; her writing st yle is clear, engaging, and pedagogically effective. Especially 
impressive is the scope and depth of her understanding of the many issues 
implicated by Hegel’s account of patriotism and cosmopolitanism. In mak-
ing her case, Moland delves into some difficult, challenging, and frequently 
misunderstood texts in the Hegelian corpus, most notably: the “Anthropology” 
section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia version of the “Philosophy of Spirit”; Hegel’s 
lectures on the philosophy of history; his lectures on the history of philosophy; 
and his lectures on aesthetics. Significantly, Moland departs from the rather 
common (and by now, the highly unoriginal) strategy of mining Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of Right for ideas about nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism. 
While Moland is quite familiar with the Philosophy of Right, her move beyond 
this one canonical text allows her to identify and unpack many important 
insights which have been systematically overlooked by others; this, in turn, 
allows her to make a compelling and original case for the claim that Hegel is 
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genuinely committed to both patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and that this 
dual commitment is a coherent and philosophically defensible one. Moland 
is well-informed about the relevant primary and secondary literature, and 
she does a fine job using this secondary literature in order to go beyond and 
proffer her own, rather innovative interpretation of Hegel.
In general, Moland has succeeded in doing what she set out to do in 
this book: she has shown, by means of serious historical and philosophical 
analysis, how Hegel offers a way in which we might conceive the compatibilit y, 
and even the interdependence, of patriotism and cosmopolitanism. I learned a 
great deal from Moland’s book, and indeed it left me wanting to learn more. 
It seems to me that the book opened up two especially promising, yet-to-be-
explored areas for further argumentation and development:
1) Moland quite rightly points out that, for Hegel, it is the modern 
state that uniquely facilitates the unit y of “personal particularit y” and 
“universal welfare,” and thus uniquely facilitates the peaceful co-existence 
of “nationalism” and “cosmopolitanism” in actual political arrangements. 
One might make the further argument that this unit y of “nationalism” and 
“cosmopolitanism” is in fact just a special case of a more important and far-
reaching conceptual or logical unit y in Hegel’s thought; this is the conceptual 
or logical unit y of the “particular” (corresponding to the “national”) and the 
“universal” (corresponding to the “cosmopolitan”); and in various places 
throughout his system, Hegel gives expression to this conceptual or logical 
unit y (most notably, in his Science of Logic). My guess is that Moland’s overall 
argument about the unit y of “nationalism” and “cosmopolitanism” might be 
mapped directly and explicitly on to a further, logical argument about the 
unit y of the “particular” and the “universal” in Hegel’s thought. Moland’s 
richly suggestive book has left me wondering whether she would agree about 
the possibilit y of such a mapping, and—if so—how she would articulate its 
conceptual-logical expression.
2) Moland convincingly argues that the Hegelian account of patriotism 
and cosmopolitanism is generally relevant to contemporary debates in po-
litical philosophy, and in particular to contemporary debates about rational 
agency, political identit y, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, 
and globalization. One might argue that Moland’s case in favor of the 
contemporary relevance of Hegel could be even further bolstered if it were 
presented alongside a direct and robust engagement with the work of various 
contemporary political philosophers (e.g. Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and 
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others) who have openly acknowledged the relevance of Hegel’s thought to 
their own. My guess (once again) is that the Hegelian position which Moland 
puts forward in this book is conceptually continuous with (and, arguably, 
more historically and philosophically rigorous than) than the positions put 
forward by Taylor, Sandel, and other post-Hegelian political philosophers. I 
would be most interested to know how Moland’s reconstruction of Hegelian 
thought might play out, if placed explicitly into dialogue with contemporary 
thinkers who have tried in their own ways to integrate pro-Hegelian insights 
into their versions of political philosophy.
To summarize: the central thesis of Moland’s book is well-explained, 
well-grounded in the relevant literature (both primary and secondary litera-
ture), and engagingly presented. The main conclusions that Moland draws 
are historically accurate and philosophically sound. The book makes insight-
ful and innovative use of primary and secondary sources, and it provides an 
excellent (indeed, ground-breaking) account of how Hegel’s favorable state-
ments about patriotism and national pride are nevertheless compatible with 
his commitment to a version of cosmopolitanism that many post-Kantian 
cosmopolitans today might endorse. The book opens up some rather com-
pelling avenues for further enquiry, especially—in my view—regarding (1) the 
logical-conceptual structure of, and (2) the contemporary relevance of, Hegel’s 
thought on nationalism and cosmopolitanism. It is greatly to be hoped that 
Moland’s future plans will include travel upon the avenues of enquiry that 
her book has so helpfully opened up.
Michael Baur
Fordham University
Slavoj Žižek. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. 
London: Verso, 2012. 1,038 pages.
Should we celebrate Žižek’s self-declared yet ironic support for the Hegelian 
philosophical legacy in the context of his clearly demoralized rejection of his 
former Marxist beliefs? Žižek proclaims, “[I]n a way, Hegel was closer to the 
mark than Marx, the twentieth century attempts to enact the Aufhebung of 
the rage of the disenfranchised masses into the will of the proletarian agent 
to resolve the social antagonisms ultimately failed, the ‘anachronistic’ Hegel 
© The Hegel Society of America - ISSN 0030-7580
DOI: 10.5840/owl2013/2014451/23 pp. 115–128
